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Culture is not new to the study of migration.  It has lurked beneath the surface for some 
time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. 
The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests 
itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in 
the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary 
widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, 
within  a  group  there  are  economically  important  shared  beliefs  (customs,  values, 
attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identify play a central 
role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them 
matters?    Properly,  we  should  be  looking  at  the  determinants  of  identity  and  the 
determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined).  But this is not what is 
done.  Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box.  Here we 
try to begin to break open the black box.  
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Migration and Culture 
Culture is not new to the study of migration.  It has lurked beneath the surface for 
some  time,  occasionally  protruding  openly  into  the  discussion,  usually  under  some 
pseudonym.  The  authors  bring  culture  into  the  open.  They  are  concerned  with  how 
culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, 
those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. 
The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors 
behave  differently,  within  a  group  there  are  economically  important  shared  beliefs 
(customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and 
identify  play  a  central  role  in  our  understanding  of  migration  as  an  economic 
phenomenon;  but  what  about  them  matters?    Properly,  we  should  be  looking  at  the 
determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly 
defined).  But this is not what is done.  Usually identity and culture appear in economics 
articles as a black box.  Here we try to begin to break open the black box. 
Migrants  are  quite  diverse.    The  here  is  on  the  distinctions  in  culture  among 
migrants,  the  families  they  left  behind,  and  the  local  population  in  the  migration 
destination.  The  new  interactions  directly  affect  all  three  groups.  Assimilation  is  one 
result; separation is also a possibility. Location choice, workplace interaction, enclave 
size,  the  opportunity  for  the  migrant  obtaining  credit  in  their  new  country,  the  local 
population’s  reaction  to  migrants,  the  political  culture  of  the  migrants  and  local 
population, links to the country-of-origin, and the economic state of the host country, all 
contribute to the classic conflict between assimilation and separation. Papers examining 
the  working  of  the  assimilation  process  on  the  migrants  themselves,  on  the  local 
population, on the families left at the home country and others can be divided into five 
non-exclusive areas:  1.  Enclaves and Location Choice; 2.  Production, Earnings and 
Competition;  3.    Assimilation  Struggles;  4.    Family  Issues  and  the  Effects  of 




1. Enclaves and Location Choice 
A  characteristic  of  international  migration  is  the  clustering  of  immigrants  in  ethnic 
communities. Prominent examples are the concentration of Turks in Germany, Tamils in 
Switzerland, Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium, Italians in Argentina, Greeks in 
Australia,  and  Ukrainians  in  Canada.  Clustering  may  be  very  narrow,  such  as  when 
immigrants from a town or region are concentrated in a specific foreign town or region. 
For example, Macedonians from Skopje have come to make up a notable part of the 
population of Gothenburg, Sweden. In the United States, noticeable clusters of Mexican 
immigrants exist in California, Texas, Florida and Chicago. Three-fourths of migrants 
from Guanajuato, the Mexican state with the highest emigration rate to the U.S., go to 
California or Texas. 
The prevailing explanation for immigrant clusters is the existence of beneficial 
network externalities when previous immigrants provide shelter and work, assistance in 
obtaining credit, and/or generally reduce the stress of relocating to a foreign culture (see 
Gottlieb,  1987,  Grossman,  1989,  Marks,  1989,  Church  and  King,  1993,  Carrington, 
Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 1996, Chiswick and Miller, 1996, Munshi, 2003). Ethnic 
networks, however, might also be associated with negative externalities. Disadvantageous 
network  externalities  may  arise  if  immigration  is  subject  to  adverse  selection,  or  if 
increases  in  immigrant  concentration  increases  competition  for  jobs  and  lowers 
immigrants’  wages.    Under  certain  conditions  the  tendency  to  cluster  may  lower 
incentives to learn the language of the host country, which in turn may “trap” migrants in 
poverty (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2009). These negative network externalities limit the 
benefits immigrants can obtain from clustering.  
A  growing  literature  investigates  the  determinants  of  location  choice  by 
immigrants.  The  first  significant  study  on  this,  Bartel  (1989),  finds  that  post-1964 
migrants to the U.S. tend to locate in cities with a high concentration of immigrants of 
similar ethnicity. She further shows that highly skilled migrants are less geographically 
concentrated and rely less on the location of fellow compatriots. Similarly, Jaeger (2007), 
who  differentiates  between  immigrants  of  different  admission  statuses,  finds  that 




Migration enclaves may be naturally limited in size. Migrants often choose to live 
together in enclaves, and to carry out a relatively large share of their transactions with 
other parties of the same enclaves – people who share a language, origin, history. Such an 
enclave  gives  the  migrants  a  clear  benefit,  particularly  if  they  are  more  likely  to 
encounter  a  cooperative  environment  in  such  a  setting.  However,  enclaves  can  feed 
xenophobia  and  make  natives  hostile  towards  the  migrants.  Such  hostility  can  be 
expected to increase as the minority grows in size. This mitigates the benefit from the 
enclave, as the hostility harms the migrants. Thus, we expect to see numerous enclaves of 
migrants spread throughout the receiving country rather than concentrated in a single 
location (Weiss and Rapoport 2003).   
Migrant and local populations interact. Each can invest in activities promoting or 
hindering assimilation. Migrants may want to assimilate, or they may want to hold onto 
their cultural identities. The local population may be welcoming or not. A major site for 
these interactions is within the firm – the proverbial “shop floor.”  As with enclaves, here 
also the size of the groups is important.  
Migrants consider several factors in making their decisions about where to move, 
including  the  clustering  of  compatriots  and  similar  folk  in  various  localities.  Ties  of 
kinship, friendship, and village, link migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the 
home and host country. Stock factors measure the degree to which migrants may view a 
location  as  (ethnically)  hospitable  and  the  availability  of  information  about  specific 
locations.  Stock  factors  may  have  an  ethnic  goods  component  and  include  village 
migration history. Flow factors measure the tendency of migrants to follow the paths of 
very recent migrants from their own villages.  
These factors offer different information to a potential migrant. The ethnic goods 
component sends signals to the migrant about the possibility of living in a culturally 
similar environment, i.e., speaking his native language, listening to his music, reading his 
own newspapers, and eating ethnic food. The ethnic goods factor reduces the monetary 
and psychic costs of migrating. The village migration history component largely captures 
information  about  the  host  region  received  in  the  home  village.  This  includes,  for 
example,  information  on  the  labor  and  housing  market,  and  information  on  specific 
employers in a region. In addition, the migrant may be able to count on contacts in a  
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specific  location  established  by  former  migrants  from  the  same  village.  This  factor 
reflects the probability of receiving help from compatriots. The flow factor represents 
potential herd behavior by migrants, a sort of “peer emulation effect.”  Following the 
argument by Epstein  (2010), migrants may  choose a location on the supposition that 
recent migrants had information that he does not have.  
Until  the  appearance  of  the  paper  by  Polachek  and  Horvath  (1977)  much  of 
migration theory treated migration as an individual investment decision. Family members 
other  than  the  household  head  are  not  always  explicitly  considered.  However,  other 
members are clearly influential in migration decisions.  Polachek and Horvath (1977) 
established the foundations for models of location choice that take into consideration all 
the different type of considerations.      They do so by adopting a life cycle approach used 
in  human  capital  theories  of  earnings accumulation,  accounting  for  household 
considerations in  both  a  general theoretical  and  empirical  model.  More  importantly, 
migration is analyzed within a nonstochastic framework and remigration is endogenously 
explained.    Bauer,  Epstein  and  Gang  (2009)  examine  the  determinants  of  a  current 
migrant's location choice emphasizing the relative importance and interaction of migrant 
stocks and flows. They show that both stocks and flow have significant impacts on the 
migrant’s  decision  of  where  to  locate.    The  significance  and  size  of  the  effects  vary 
according to legal status and whether the migrant is a “new” or a “repeat” migrant 
  A different aspect of locational outcomes considers how extensive is polarization 
based on wages and other economic indicators. Deutsch (2010) takes a multidimensional 
approach to the measurement of well-being, checks whether there has been a change in 
the degree of (group) polarization in the distribution of well-being in Israel.  Deutsch 
(2010) shows how it is possible to decompose by population subgroups the polarization 
index. This polarization index is related to the Gini index and its components so that 
previous results on the decomposition of the Gini index may be incorporated. Two main 
cases  are  examined,  that  of  non-overlapping  groups  and  that  of  overlapping  groups. 
Using Israeli data he shows decreasing polarization from 1990-2004. 
Polarization has many aspects; one is education. The payoff to schooling among 
the foreign born in the U.S. is only around one-half of the payoff for the native born. 
Chiswick and Miller (2010) examines whether this differential is related to the quality of  
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the  schooling  immigrants  acquired  abroad.  They  use  the  Over-education/Required 
education/Under-education  specification  of  the  earnings  equation  to  explore  the 
transmission mechanism for the origin-country school quality effects. They also assess 
the empirical merits of two alternative measures of the quality of schooling undertaken 
abroad.  Their  results  suggest  that  a  higher  quality  of  schooling  acquired  abroad  is 
associated with a higher payoff to schooling among immigrants in the U.S. labor market. 
This higher payoff is associated with a higher payoff to correctly matched schooling in 
the  U.S.,  and  a  greater  (in  absolute  value)  penalty  associated  with  years  of  under-
education. A set of predictions is presented to assess the relative importance of these 
channels, and the over-education channel is shown to be the more influential factor.  This 
channel is linked to greater positive selection in migration among those from countries 
with better quality  school.   In other words, it is the impact of origin country  school 
quality  on  the  immigrant  selection  process,  rather  than  the  quality  of  immigrants’ 
schooling  per  se,  that  is  the  major  driver  of  the  lower  payoff  to  schooling  among 
immigrants in the U.S..  
Another aspect of locational choice is migrant mobility. Policy-makers in OECD 
countries appear to be increasingly concerned about growing migration pressure from 
developing countries. At the same time, at least within Europe, they typically complain 
about the low level of internal labor mobility. Faini  and Venturini  (2010) try to shed 
light on the issues of both internal and external labor mobility. They investigate the link 
between  development  and  migration  and  argue,  on  both  theoretical  and  empirical 
grounds, that it is likely non-linear. More precisely, they find that, in a relatively poor 
sending  country,  an  increase  in  income  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  propensity  to 
migrate,  even  if  we  control  for  the  income  differential  with  the  receiving  country, 
because the financial constraint of the poorest become less binding. Conversely, if the 
home country is relatively better off, an increase in income may be associated with a fall 
in the propensity to migrate  even  for  an unchanged income differential. Econometric 
estimation for Southern Europe over the period 1962-1988 provides substantial support to 
this approach. They estimate first the level of income for which the financial constraint is 
no longer binding, around $950, and then the level of income for which the propensity to 
migrate declines, which is around $4300 in 1985 prices. They therefore predict a steady  
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decline in the propensity to migrate from Southern European countries. Similarly, their 
results  highlight  the  possibility  that  the  pressure  to  migrate  from  Northern  African 
countries and other developing countries may increase with further growth. 
Taking  a  broader  view  Kaushal  and  Kaestner  (2010)  study  the  correlates  of 
immigrant  location  and  migration  choices  to  address  the  following  questions:  What 
location-specific,  economic  and  demographic  factors  are  associated  with  these 
choices?  Does the influence of these factors differ by immigrant characteristics?  What 
explains  the  observed  increase  in  immigrant  geographic  dispersion  during  the 
1990s?   Their  analysis  suggests  that:  (1)  there  is  significant  heterogeneity  in  the 
correlates of immigrant location and migration choices; associations vary by immigrant 
birthplace, age, gender, education and duration of residence in the U.S.. (2) Economic 
factors are, for the most part, weakly associated with immigrant location decisions. (3) 
Immigrants appear to be more attracted to states with large (growing) populations; less 
attracted to states with a high proportion of other foreign-born persons; more attracted to 
states  with  high  unionization,  and  less  attracted  to  states  with  high  crime.  (4)  The 
association  between  location-specific  characteristics  and  immigrant  location  choices 
changed between 1990 and 2000 for some immigrant groups and this explains most of the 
increase in geographic dispersion during the nineties. In contrast, changes in location 
attributes and changes in immigrant composition explain relatively little of the increase in 
dispersion. 
 
2. Production, Earnings and Competition 
The  analysis  of  immigrants’  contributions  to  the  economy  has  concentrated  on 
immigrants’ impact on native’s employment and wages of (Baldwin-Grossman, 1982, 
Gang  and  Rivera-Batiz,  1994,  Friedberg  and  Hunt,  1995,  Borjas,  2003,  Card,  2005, 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2008.  Immigration affects relative supply of workers with different 
characteristics  and  effects  workers  differently  depending  on  their  characteristics.  The 
debate  has  generally  turned  on  the  degree  of  substitutability  or  complementarity  of 
immigrants and the native-born: if immigrants tend to cluster into jobs requiring mostly 
manual work and little education or experience, and the native-born hold jobs requiring 
higher levels of education and/or experience, how would increased immigration affect the  
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wages of the native-born?  The answer is, of course, directly related to whether low-
skilled and highly-skilled labor are substitutes or complements.  This is very nicely laid 
out in Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009). The papers in this section push beyond the 
scope of the received tradition. 
  The  classic  confrontation  between  immigrants  and  the  local  population  takes 
place  in  the  labor  market.    While  many  papers  deal  with  labor  market  concerns,  the 
papers in this section tackle key issues head on, providing new insights to well-worn 
subject matter.  For example, it is very clear that otherwise similar-looking immigrants 
and locals earn different amounts and have different jobs.  The question is whether these 
differences  constitute  discrimination,  or  is  something  else  going  on.  If  it  is 
discrimination, what is at the root of it?  In part, immigrant earnings are the outcome of 
the friction between the migrants and the local population. The willingness of the local 
population to accept the migrants also plays a role here. In terms of assimilation, the 
effect  of  the  borrowing  constraint  facing  new  immigrants  on  the  process  of  their 
assimilation in the new society is important. Those who succeed enjoy a higher level of 
productivity and therefore wages in the future. The level of investment is endogenously 
determined. Thus, an important assimilation issue is the possibility of borrowing. On this 
issue, migrants and the local population differ. 
  Empirical evidence on the labor market performance of immigrants shows that 
migrant  workers  suffer  from  an  initial  disadvantage  compared  to  observationally 
equivalent native workers, but that their wages subsequently tend to increase faster than 
native earnings. Economists usually explain these phenomena by spot markets for labor 
and investments into human capital. By contrast, Schmidt (2010) proposes a contract 
theoretic model. This alternative has important implications for integration policy, since 
it  suggests  investing  into  the  transparency  of  foreign  educational  credentials.  Also 
contrasting human capital theory, the model suggests that permanent migrants never earn 
higher wages than equally skilled temporary migrants.  
One should not ignore the interaction between the local and foreigner workers. 
Epstein and Mealem (2010) consider the interaction between local workers and migrants 
in the production process of a firm. Both local workers and migrants can invest effort in 
assimilation activities in order to increase the assimilation of migrants into the firm and  
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by doing increase their interaction and production activities. They consider the effect, the 
relative size (in the firm) of each group and the cost of activities has on the assimilation 
process  of  the  migrants.    One  of  the  outcomes  of  this  model  is  specialization  in 
production. If this is the outcome then the question that comes to mind is: are ethnic 
specialization and thus a downward sloping labor demand curve fundamental features of 
labor  market  competition  between  ethnic  groups?  In  a  general  equilibrium  model, 
Kahanec  (2010)  argues  that  spillover  effects  in  skill  acquisition  and  social  distances 
between ethnic groups engender equilibrium regimes of skill acquisition that differ in 
their  implications  for  ethnic  specialization.  Specifically,  fundamental  relationships 
through which relative group sizes determine whether ethnic specialization arises and in 
what degree are established. Thus, his paper theoretically justifies a downward sloping 
labor demand curve and explains why some ethnic groups earn more than others, ethnic 
minorities underperforming or outperforming majorities.   
  As  presented  above,  migrants  are  many  times  paid  differently  than  the  local 
population. Bodvarsson and Sessions (2010) focus on immigrant workers paid differently 
than  their  equally  productive  native-born  counterparts  (“nationality  discrimination”). 
Constructing a theory and test of nationality discrimination is particularly challenging 
because: (a) foreign- and native-born workers in the same occupation are very likely to be 
imperfect substitutes in production, owing to the former group’s imperfectly transferrable 
human  capital;  but  (b)  the  literature  offers  only  models  where  majority  and  minority 
workers are perfect substitutes. In the theory section a generalized Leontief production 
function where native and immigrant workers are distinct inputs is articulated. In the 
empirical section, a U.S. test case is available: Major League Baseball (MLB). The data 
set consists of 1,093 hitters and 1,204 pitchers for four seasons during 1992-98, a period 
during which the industry expanded. Salary, experience, player performance, and team 
performance data come from the Lahmann Baseball Database and race and nationality are 
inferred  from  Topps  baseball  cards.  Estimates  of  nationality  discrimination  against 
immigrant players in both job categories are obtained.    
Culture is intimately linked to pecuniary incentives –to earnings and productivity.  
This  is  brought  out  in  Sriniver  (2010)  who  shows  immigrants  do  in  fact  respond  to  
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economic  incentives  in  acquiring  proficiency  in  the  language  of  the  host  country, 
particularly immigrants with 13+ years of schooling.   
 
3. Assimilation Struggles 
Some migrants stay in their new country and some go back home.  Those who return 
home bring with them experience and, perhaps, higher human capital. To what extent do 
the socio-economic characteristics of circular/repeat migrants differ from migrants who 
return permanently to their home country after their first trip (i.e. return migrants)? What 
determines each of these distinctive temporary migration forms? What happens to those 
who do not return, though they continue sending remittances home? What effect does this 
have on the migrants and those left at home?  
Minority ethnic group participation in labor markets is quite complex and in many 
ways different from that of citizens belonging to a nation’s majority ethnicity. Studies of 
minorities around the world show, with few exceptions, that they tend to earn wages 
substantially below those of comparable majority workers (Altonji and Blank 1999, Blau 
and Kahn, 1997, 2006, 2007, Smith and Welch, 1989, Bhaumik, Gang and Yun, 2006). 
Partly, this reflects a failure on the part of the minority group to undertake the effort to 
assimilate with the majority (Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2009). “Lack of 
effort” can arise from the desire to maintain a cultural heritage or separate identity which 
would be lost or reduced if the group assimilated.  The failure to take active steps to 
assimilate can also arise in the face of high adjustment costs, such as inadequate language 
skills,  intergenerational  familial  conflicts,  and,  in  the  case  of  immigrants,  lack  of 
knowledge about the host country labor market (Chiswick and Miller, 1995, 1996, Bauer, 
Epstein and Gang, 2005). Yet for immigrants and their descendants, as length of time in 
the host country increases, assimilation generally creeps in and various immigrant labor 
market indicators approach those of comparable majority workers. On occasion, minority 
workers  outperform  majority  workers  (Chiswick,  1977,  Deutsch,  Epstein  and  Lecker, 
2006). 
Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements working to bring minorities 
into line with the majority.  A third element, the degree to which the majority welcomes 
the minority, also plays a role.  Often, the majority is less than welcoming, blaming the  
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minority for depressing wages and displacing majority workers – i.e., causing majority 
unemployment. This presumption has very strong policy implications and is implicit, for 
example, in the calls for increased regulation of immigration heard worldwide. Yet, there 
is mixed evidence on the impact of minorities on majority wages and employment – it 
depends on whether they are substitutes or complements with respect to the skills and 
other  attributes  they  bring  to  the  labor  market  (Gang  and  Rivera-Batiz  1994,  Gang, 
Rivera-Batiz  and  Yun  2002).  Whether  minorities  actually  lower  wages  and  increase 
employment, or not, the perception exists that they do so.  Because of this perception the 
majority  may  take  active  steps  to  discourage  minority  assimilation  –  discrimination, 
isolation, and so on. 
Often the efforts of the minority and the majority are mediated through political 
institutions. These institutions exist in both the minority and majority worlds.  They could 
be,  for  example,  political  parties,  trade  organizations,  unions,  or  thugs.    These  are 
organizations that are able to overcome the free-rider problem individual members of 
each group have in moving from the actions they desire to take, to actually taking the 
actions.  Yet, while an organization’s purpose may be to represent the members of their 
group, the interests’ of the organization and that of its members do no always coincide. 
The  work  here  adds  to  the  blossoming  literature  on  majority  –  minority  conflict  and 
resolution, assimilation, and the reestablishment of cultural identity (see, for example, 
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, Anas, 2002, Bisin and Verdier, 2000, Dustmann, Fabbri 
and Preston, 2004, Kahanec, 2006, and Lazear, 1999). 
Epstein  and  Gang  (2009)  are  interested  in  why  minorities  are  so  often  at  a 
disadvantage relative to the majority, the circumstances under which their status changes 
or  stagnates  over  time,  and  role  public  policy  can  play.    Assimilation  efforts  by  the 
minority, harassment by the majority and time are the three elements that determine how 
well the minority does in comparison to the majority.  They examine the consequences 
for these of increases in the numbers of members of the minority, time, and the role of the 
political entity.  They construct a model in which there are four actors:  the members of 
the majority and the organization that represents them, and members of the minority and 
the  organization  that  represents  them.  Over  time,  the  political  entity  representing  the 
minority and the members of the minority exhibit different interests in assimilating and in  
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maintaining their cultural identity.  They discuss how this affects the minority’s position 
over time and discuss the public policy implications of the model. 
Some view migration and crime as dependant.  The Bodenhorn, Moehling and 
Piehl (2010) study provides a fresh look at the question of immigration and crime by 
looking at mid-nineteenth century data created from the records of Pennsylvania’s state 
prisons  from  the  1830s  to  the  1870s.    These  records  provide  information  on  the 
birthplace,  age,  prior  occupation,  county  of  conviction,  crime,  and  sentence  of  all 
individuals entering the prisons.  With these data we can examine the share of immigrants 
in prison commitments as well as in the prison population on a given date.  These data, 
when combined with data on the general population, allows them to determine whether 
immigrants  were  disproportionately  incarcerated  in  general  and  for  violent  crimes  in 
particular,  and  whether  immigrant  incarceration  patterns  changed  over  time  as 
immigrants assimilated to life in the U.S.  The use of micro data that allows analysis by 
type  of  crime  and  age  provides  a  much  tighter  and  much  richer  understanding  of 
immigrant participation in crime.  Impressions of immigrants as a source of violence and 
disruption are longstanding.  Furthermore, they underlie many of the theories of culture 
conflict and assimilation.  Modern empirical methods and detailed population data allows 
to revisit these age-old research questions with a sharper focus. 
  Within  immigrant  society  there  is  often  a  conflict  between  those  arguing  for 
assimilation and those demanding an independent identity for the group.  Of course there 
are  many  shades  to  this  discussion;  immigrant  societies  are  multi-layered  and  multi-
dimensional with many  viewpoints.  One point of view may  come into conflict with 
others  because  of  the  development  of  rivalrous  strategies,  at  least  partly  overlapping 
followers, and/or the necessity of laying claim to having the bigger impact. Supporters of 
each  point  of  view  invest  resources  and  effort  into  convincing  the  general  body  of 
immigrants of the virtue of their point of view and therefore having an effect.  Epstein 
and Gang (2010) develop economic theory that considers how such a competition affects 
the resources invested by the supporters and how beneficial it is to the immigrant group.  
Fertig  (2010)  investigates  whether  and  to  what  extent  immigrants  in  Germany  are 
integrated  into  German  society  by  utilizing  a  variety  of  qualitative  information  and 
subjective  data  collected  in  the  1999  wave  of  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  
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(GSOEP). To this end,  leisure-time activities and attitudes of native Germans, ethnic 
Germans and foreign immigrants of different generations are compared. The empirical 
results suggest that conditional on observable characteristics the activities and attitudes of 
foreign  immigrants  from  both  generations  differ  much  more  from  those  of  native 
Germans than the activities/attitudes of ethnic Germans. Furthermore, the attitudes of 
second-generation immigrants tend to be characterized by a larger degree of fatalism, 
pessimism and self-doubt than those of all other groups, although their activities and 
participation in societal life resemble more those of native Germans than those of their 
parents’ generation. 
  Whose role in helping the second generation to assimilate and get along in their 
new country is more important, the mother’s or the father’s?  Gang (2010)   examines  the 
differential  effects  of  mother's  schooling  and  father's  schooling  on  the  acquisition  of 
schooling by their offspring.  The context is "cross-cultural", comparing results across 
three  countries:    Germany,  Hungary  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union.  Within  these 
countries,  it  looks  at  difference  by  gender  and  by  different  ethnic  subgroups.    The 
evidence is, generally, that father's schooling is more important than mother's schooling, 
but  this  does  vary  by  ethnic  group.    Moreover,  mother's  schooling  plays  a  relatively 
larger role for females. 
  Kahanec and Yuksul (2010) investigate the effects of vulnerability on educational 
outcomes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia using a unique 
2004  UNDP  dataset.  Treating  the  collapse  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  as  a  natural 
experiment,  they  compare  educational  achievement  and  intergenerational  transfer  of 
human capital for three groups that have been differently affected by the wars and post-
war distress: the majority as the benchmark, the ex-ante and ex-post vulnerable Roma 
people, and the ex ante equal but ex-post vulnerable internally displaced people (IDPs). 
Their  findings  reveal  significant  negative  effects  of  vulnerability  on  educational 
attainment. IDPs seem to be more negatively affected than Roma and both groups exhibit 
significant inertia in intergenerational transfer of human capital. They find evidence that 
this inertia is stronger for the Roma. Their findings highlight the need for policies that not 
only tackle vulnerability as such, but address the spillover effects of current vulnerability 
on future educational attainment.   
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   In the struggle for assimilation credit markets may play an important role. Lahiri 
(2010) examines the effect of borrowing constraints facing new immigrants in the process 
of their assimilation in their new society. He does so in two-period model. In period one, 
the immigrants invest, with some costs to them, in trying to assimilate. The probability of 
success in this endeavor depends on the amount invested and on the level of the provision 
of a `public' good paid for by lump-sum taxation of the `natives'. Those who succeed 
enjoy  a  higher  level  of  productivity  and  therefore  wages  in  period  2.  The  level  of 
investment  is  endogenously  determined.  Given  this  framework,  Lahiri  (2010) 
characterize  the  optimal  level  of  the  public  good  provision.  This  is  done  under  two 
scenarios regarding the credit market facing new migrants. In the first, they can borrow as 
much  as  they  want  in  period  1  at  an  exogenously  given  interest  rate.  In  the  second 
scenarios,  there  is  a  binding  borrowing  constraint.  Lahiri  (2010)  compares  the 
equilibrium level of `assimilation' under the two scenarios. 
             There  is  a  well-established  high  quality  literature  on  the  role  of  networks, 
particularly  ethnic  networks,  in  international  trade.    Ethnic  networks  are  a  way  of 
overcoming  informal  barriers  (information  costs,  risk  and  uncertainty)  to  trade  by 
building trust and substituting for the difficulty of enforcing contracts internationally. 
Networks form between migrants and natives in the host country and between migrants 
and  their  home  country.      Ethnic  networks  exist  when  assimilation  is  not  complete.  
Epstein and Gang (2006) consider the struggle of migrants to assimilate and, at the same 
time, the struggle of the local population to prevent such assimilation.  These activities 
affect trade possibilities.  Moreover, they show that it may well be in the interest of 
migrants  who  specialize  in  trade  to,  at  some  point  in  time,  turn  from  investing  in 
assimilation activities and instead invest in anti-assimilation activities in order to preserve 
immigrants’  preferences  for  home  country  goods.    There  is  increasing  evidence  in 
empirical trade that the immigrant population provides the social and co-ethnic networks 
that facilitate trade with their home country by removing some informal trade barriers 
and lowering transactions cost to trade. Immigrants’ carry home-country information that 
helps in matching buyers and sellers and enforcement of trading contacts (information 
effect) and immigrants affect imports by demanding goods from their home countries 
(demand  effect).  Usually,  the  size  of  immigrant  stock  –  both  older  cohorts  and  new  
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entrants  –  captures  network  size.  However,  as  immigrants  stay  longer  in  their  host 
country their information and demand effects may weaken or strengthen.  This varies 
across immigrant groups and type of goods.  Trade flows between the host and the home 
country change in response. Mundra (2010) focuses on the role of immigrants’ economic 
assimilation on the U.S. bilateral trade using a panel data for 63 trading partners as well 
as immigrant sending countries over the period 1990 - 2000. She examines whether the 
immigrants’  assimilation  effect  on  trade  varies  across  the  homogenous  goods  and 
differentiated products. 
 
4. Family Issues and the Effects of Remittances 
Migration is not generally a purely individual decision; most frequently it takes place in a 
family context. One or two members of the family migrate; the others stay in their home 
country. For example, for those from Central America and Mexico it is not uncommon 
for a mother or father (or both) to migrate to the United States and leave their children 
behind. After the parent(s) have achieved some degree of stability in the United States, 
the children follow. There are many important questions. Are children separated from 
parents during migration more likely to fall behind others their age in school? Are they 
are more likely to drop out of high school? Does the impact of separation for children 
differ  when  separated  from  their  mothers  or  fathers?    Migration  may  change  family 
structure in the host country as they interact with the local economy and new culture.  
This may have strong and important effects on migrant identity and socialization and 
their willingness to assimilate (Gang and Zimmermann, 2000).  
The  growth perspectives of European Union member countries  are seen to be 
crucially related to the challenge of mobilizing people to work. One issue is that non-
economic migrants have more difficulties in economic performance and labor market 
integration, and are a larger potential burden to the social security systems than economic 
migrants. Recent work in Denmark and Germany (see Tranaes and Zimmermann, 2004, 
Schultz-Nielsen  and  Constant,  2004,  Constant  and  Zimmermann,  2005  and  Constant, 
Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2009) provides new evidence indicating that an ever-rising 
number  of  immigrants  are  unavailable  to  the  labor  force.  Instead,  migrants  arrive  as 
refugees,  asylum  seekers  or  for  family  reunification  purposes.  Differences  in  labor  
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market  attachment  might  be  due  to  differences  in  individual  characteristics  across 
ethnicities and within ethnicities.  
  The effect of migration and remittances on non-migrating family members has 
long attracted attention.  Migration and remittances can increase investment in human 
and physical capital (Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003, Hildebrand and McKenzie, 2003, 
Mesnard, 2004), reduce poverty and alter inequality in the home country (Adams, 1992; 
Taylor and Wyatt, 1996). It can also induce chain migration (Dimova and Wolff, 2009). 
Recent research links migration, transfers and child labor, showing in the aftermath of 
migration and the transfers sent by emigrating parents may enable the children and other 
family members to stop working (Epstein and Kahana, 2008).  
In recent years, both the structure of families and household composition changed 
dramatically. For example, more and more young people leave the house of their parents 
before the establishment of their own family; more and more young couples live together 
without marriage, etc.  Cohen Goldner (2010) explores immigrant family structure in 
Israel and follows the dynamics of immigrants' households as a function of time in the 
new country and labor market performance. Upon arrival a typical immigrant household 
consists of more than one family. This pattern reflected the economic constraints that 
immigrant  faced  upon  arrival  and  the  need  to  save  additional  costs,  as  well  as  a 
sociological  need  of  immigrants  to  "stick  together".  However,  as  immigrants  are 
integrated in the labor market and time passes, the share of households consisting of more 
than one family diminishes.   To what extent do the socio-economic characteristics of 
circular/repeat  migrants  differ  from  migrants  who  return  permanently  to  the  home 
country  after  their  first  trip  (i.e.  return  migrants)?  What  determines  each  of  these 
distinctive  temporary  migration  forms?  Piracha  and  Vadean  (2010)  using  Albanian 
household survey data and both a multinomial logit model and a maximum simulated 
likelihood  (MSL)  probit  with  two  sequential  selection  equations  find  that  education, 
gender, age, geographical location and the return reasons from the first migration trip 
significantly affect the choice of migration form. Compared to return migrants, circular 
migrants are more likely to be male, have primary education and originate from rural, less 
developed areas. Moreover, return migration seems to be determined by family reasons, a 
failed migration attempt but also the fulfillment of a savings target.  
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Remittances have long been viewed as a means to combat poverty, to improve 
consumption,  to  raise  standard  of  living.  Remittances,  however,  can  also  enable 
investment  in  human  capital  resources  (especially  education)  of  the  next  generation. 
Haberfeld, Semyonov and Xing (2010) examines the impact of remittances sent by labor 
migrants from India on the standard of living (as a proxy of consumption) and on the 
education  of  young  children  (as  a  proxy  of  investment  in  human  capital)  on  non-
migrating  family  members.  The  analysis  is  conducted  on  a  randomly  selected 
representative  sample  of  households  in  Rajasthan.  Three  types  of  households  are 
distinguished:  575  having  labor  migrants,  162  without  current  migrants,  and  232  not 
having migrants at present but sent migrants in the past. Analysis of the data reveals 
meaningful  differences  among  the  types  of  households.  Those  having  current  labor 
migrants are characterized by the highest standard of living but at the same time by a low 
level  of  children's  education.  Further  analyses  suggest  that  remittances  are  likely  to 
increase  consumption  and  improve  standard  of  living  but  have  very  little  effect  on 
children's education.  
Earlier research found that children separated from parents during migration are 
more likely to lag behind others their age in school and are more likely to drop out of 
high school.  The negative impact of separation during migration on educational success 
is  largest  for  children  separated  from  their  mothers  (in  contrast  to  fathers),  for  those 
whose parents have lived in the United States illegally, and for those who reunited with 
parents as teenagers (rather than at younger ages). Poggio and Gindling (2010) suggest 
public policies to help immigrant children separated from parents during migration to 
succeed in U.S. schools.  The policies are based on focus group discussion with parents 
separated from their children during migration, interviews with psychologists and school 
administrators,  and  an  on-line  survey  of  elementary  and  high  school  teachers.
  DeVoretz and Vadean (2010) analyze the effect of cultural differences amongst 
ethnic groups on the remittance behavior of native and immigrant households in Canada. 
In  contrast  to  the  literature  that  examines  remittance  motivation  in  the framework  of 
extended  family  agreements,  they  embed  remittances  in  a  formal  demand  system, 
suggesting  that  they  represent  expenditures  on  social  relations  with  relatives  and/or 
friends and contribute to membership in social/religious organizations respectively. The  
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results  indicate  strong  ethnic  group  cultural  differences  in  the  remittance  behavior  of 
recent Asian immigrant households and highlight the importance of differentiating with 
respect to cultural background when analyzing the determinants of remittances. 
 
5.  Selection, Attitudes and Public Policy 
Cost, benefits, and the local population's reaction affect public policy. We see this in the 
different policies towards migration as reported by governments to the United Nations 
Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs  between  1976  and  2007.  Preliminary 
evidence  shows  that  most  governments  have  policies  aimed  at  either  maintaining  the 
status  quo  or  at  lowering  the  level  of  migration.  The  UN  dataset  also  allows  us  to 
document  variation  in  migration  policies  over  time  and  across  countries  of  different 
regions and incomes.    
Battisti  and  DeVoretz  (2010)  investigate  the  economic  performance  of 
immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries in Canada. The contribution 
of their paper lies in its use of a natural experiment to detect possible differential labor 
market performances of Soviet immigrants prior to and after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In short, the collapse of the former Soviet Union allows an exogenous supply 
change in the number and type of FSU immigrants potentially destined to enter Canada. 
For this purpose, Census micro-level data from the 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 Canadian 
Census are utilized to estimate earnings and employment outcomes for pre- and post-
FSU immigrants.  
The first goal of Facchini and Mayda (2010) is to measure the restrictiveness of 
policies towards migration as reported by governments to the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007. Preliminary evidence shows that 
most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering 
the  level  of  migration.  The  UN  dataset  also  allows  them  to  document  variation  in 
migration policies over time and across countries of different regions and income levels. 
Finally,  it  makes  it  possible  to  examine  patterns  in  different  aspects  of  destination 
countries’ migration policies, such as policies towards family reunification, temporary vs. 
permanent migration and highly skilled migration. This analysis leads to an investigation 
of  the  political-economy  determinants  of  destination  countries’  migration  policy.  
 
19 
Facchini and Mayda (2010)’s goal is to develop a framework in which voters’ attitudes 
represent  a  key  component  and  to  examine  the  link  between  these  attitudes  and 
governments’ policy decisions. To that end, they merge the information contained in the 
UN  migration-policy  dataset  with  cross-country  data  on  individual  attitudes  towards 
immigrants.  They  use  data  on  public  opinion  from  the  International  Social  Survey 
Programme, National Identity Module, for the years 1995 and 2003. The merged datasets 
allow us to investigate whether – within a median voter framework (Benhabib 1996, 
Ortega 2005, Facchini and Testa 2008) – voters’ migration attitudes are consistent with 
migration policy decisions as reported by governments.  
The link between ethnic conflicts and international trafficking is an issue that has 
recently received a surge in international attention. The main argument is that internal 
conflicts encourage the internal displacement of individuals from networks of family and 
community, and their access to economic and social safety nets. These same individuals 
are particularly vulnerable to being trafficked, by the hopes of better economic prospects 
elsewhere.  Akee,  Baus,  Chau  and  Khamis  (2010)  take  this  link  between  ethnic 
fragmentation and international trafficking to the data for the first time, making use of a 
novel dataset of international trafficking. They conduct a two-stage estimation, which 
highlights  the  ultimate  impact  of  ethnic  fragmentation  and  conflict  on  international 
trafficking, both directly, and indirectly through their impacts on the scale of internal 
displacements.  From a different angle Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun (2010) explores the 
determinants  of  the  attitudes  of  European  citizens  towards  non-European  Union 
foreigners  using  samples  from  the  Eurobarometer  Surveys.  They  carry  out  a  probit 
analysis of some of the key factors influencing the attitudes of European Union citizens 
towards foreigners and their changes over time.  They study the roles of labor market, 
concentration of immigrants in neighborhoods, racial prejudice and education on anti-
foreigner  sentiment.  Implementing  the  Oaxaca-type  decomposition  analysis  based  on 
probit estimates show a generally rising trend towards greater racial prejudice, and the 
decline in the strength of educational attainment in reducing negative attitudes towards 
foreigners,  contributes to the increased  anti-foreigner attitudes.  Along the same line, 
Katav-Herz  (2010)  examines  how  social  norms  affect  a  local  population's  attitudes 
toward immigration. A model is set out showing how a trade off can arise between the  
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contribution of immigration to the welfare of the local population and the concerns about 
changes in social norms. The paper addresses three questions. The first question concerns 
the  determination  of  immigration  policy  through  majority  voting  when  a  population 
differs in attitudes to changes in social norms. The second question concerns how social 
norms  can  impede  the  realization  of  the  benefits  of  immigration  as  a  solution  for 
financing intergenerational transfers to retired people in an ageing population. The third 
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